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HANNAH V. MEISEN-VEHRS∗ 
Opening Medical Settlements for the 
Public Good: Why Medical Cases 
Justify Secrecy in Settlement 
hen patients walk into their doctor’s office they do not expect 
to walk out with a lawsuit.  They probably do not expect that 
their visit will result in worse injuries, or that they may someday be 
forced to explain their medical problems to a tribunal of their peers to 
receive compensation.  When patients must turn to the legal system, 
many choose settlement over a public trial.  Settlement in medical 
cases happens for many reasons.  For example, doctors can preserve 
their reputations from public questioning and claimants can expedite 
their claims, which can be crucial in cases of ongoing injuries.  
Whatever other benefits settlement brings, privacy may be the most 
important.  Patients expect confidentiality when they walk into the 
doctor’s office and that does not necessarily change when they leave, 
harmed. 
Several jurisdictions have enacted laws that challenge this 
expectation of privacy.  Before, claimants could include a 
confidentiality clause in their final settlement agreement — a contract 
between the parties to keep information relating to the claim 
confidential.  Twelve jurisdictions1 now have “[s]unshine in 
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1 ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SEALED SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENTS IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT 2–3 (2004), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sealset3.pdf/$file/sealset3.pdf. 
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litigation” laws2 that either abolish confidential or “secret” 
settlements or severely limit their use and enforcement in court.  
Other jurisdictions may feel pressure to follow this trend.  However, 
sunshine laws, especially when applied to medical cases, threaten 
important rights of claimants: confidentiality, autonomy, and privacy. 
Compelling cases have challenged the practice of secret settlement.  
Secret settlements have been justified through the legal concepts of 
freedom of contract, client autonomy, and the duty of confidentiality.3  
But, in cases of great public interest, these concerns fade away.  A 
claimant may have an interest in contracting for a better settlement 
amount by agreeing to keep her claim secret, but this interest pales in 
comparison to the public’s right to know — assuming there is such a 
right.  For example, Firestone used secret settlements for eight years 
in resolving the early claims from injuries arising from flaws in 
Firestone tires and Ford SUVs.4  Afterward, some interest groups 
argued that if states had barred secret settlements many lives could 
have been saved.5  These claims fuel the fear that companies are 
aware of dangerous products and can effectively hide such knowledge 
from the public with the help of the judicial system.6  However, the 
debate over secret settlements does not merely posit defendants 
hiding from liability against the uninformed public.  Some claimants 
have legitimate and important privacy interests in keeping their 
 
2 See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1); FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2004); D.S.C. LOCAL R. 5.03 
(2008). 
3 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2007) (duty of confidentiality). 
4 Susan P. Koniak, Are Agreements to Keep Secret Information Learned in Discovery 
Legal, Illegal, or Something in Between?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783, 783–84 (2002); 
Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions and Unintended 
Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1457, 1457 (2006). 
5 Press Release, Consumers Union, Consumers Union Supports Bills to Limit Secret 
Out-of-Court Settlements (Dec. 4, 2000) (“Many lives could be saved and much suffering 
could be averted if corporations were not allowed to use secrecy orders in court 
settlements to hide information about product defects, environmental hazards, or financial 
fraud.” (quoting Elisa Odabashian, Senior Policy Analyst, Consumers Union’s West Coast 
Office)).  Several states acted on this advice. Rebecca A. Womeldorf & William S.D. 
Cravens, More Sunshine Laws Proposed: After the Firestone Recalls, 10 States and the US 
Senate Introduced Bills to Limit Secret Orders, Agreements, 24 NAT’L 12, Nov. 12, 2001, 
at B14. 
6 See Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Hidden from the Public by Order of the Court: The Case 
Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711 (2004).  Tire cases in general 
have had a big impact on the implementation of sunshine laws.  See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co. v. Jones, 929 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (tire company case 
concerning Florida’s Sunshine in Litigation law); Gen. Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 
520, 523 (Tex. 1998) (tire case concerning Texas’s statute barring the sealing of court 
records or settlements). 
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claims out of the public eye.  The public may have an interest in 
protecting citizens from such exposure. 
The story of the Dalkon Shield cases presents an important 
example in which a claimant’s privacy interests conflict with the 
public’s interest in knowing.7  In the early 1970s, thousands of 
women suffered injury or death as a result of using a contraceptive 
device called the Dalkon Shield.  The device, sold and marketed by 
the A.H. Robins company throughout the United States and abroad, 
had disastrous effects on its consumers.  Though the company tried 
for some time to keep the product’s dangerous effects hidden from the 
public,8 eventually the affected women brought the issue to light in 
what was the largest medical product liability suit in U.S. history.9  
Medical cases like this bring forth nuanced issues embedded in the 
debate over secret settlements.  Medical products liability cases, in 
particular, often include products that present substantial danger to the 
public.  The cases inevitably involve deeply personal information that 
claimants expect to remain private.10  The Dalkon Shield defendants 
did extensive discovery into the women’s personal and sexual 
histories, forcing women to disclose sensitive information about their 
bodies.11  In the end, the claimants exposed a disturbing story of 
deceit and corporate indifference in the face of immense suffering.12  
The Dalkon Shield cases only involved women; women are 
frequently the victims of medical device failures and face difficult 
obstacles if they turn to the tort system.13  Because of the cruel ways 
in which the details of the women’s lives were forced into the public 
light, some dropped their claims or did not bring claims at all.14  
Several women declined to go to trial and settled out of court 
instead;15 while some likely settled secretly. 
 
7 See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989). 
8 Richard A. Zitrin, The Case Against Secret Settlements (Or, What You Don’t Know 
Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 115, 120 (1999). 
9 RONALD J. BACIGAL, THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION: THE DALKON SHIELD 
CONTROVERSY 3 (1990). 
10 See infra notes 73–75 and accompanying text (HIPPA regulations and the Mann case 
reflect society’s perception that medical information should be private). 
11 BACIGAL, supra note 9, at 18–20. 
12 See infra Part II. 
13 See infra notes 74, 77, 78, 80 and accompanying text. 
14 Miles W. Lord, The Dalkon Shield Litigation: Revised Annotated Reprimand by Chief 
Judge Miles W. Lord, 9 HAMLINE L. REV. 7, 9, 27 n.11, 28 n.15 (1986). 
15 SUSAN PERRY & JIM DAWSON, NIGHTMARE: WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD 6 
(1985). 
 674 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 671 
Does public enlightenment justify the personal exposure these 
women had to endure to resolve their cases?  Claimants must often 
share the intimate details of their lives in pursuit of legal redress.  Yet, 
secret settlement offers some assurance of privacy.  The move toward 
alternative dispute resolution was a step forward in respecting 
claimants’ privacy.  Now, sunshine laws take a step back.  Rather 
than exposing harms, these laws subject the members of the public 
most harmed to another form of harm by refusing to respect their 
interest in privacy.  Despite the importance to the public, strictly 
enforcing sunshine laws, particularly in medical cases, threatens other 
important values in our society: confidentiality, autonomy, and 
privacy.  Thus, courts should enforce secret settlements for medical 
claimants with strong privacy interests, but also consider alternatives 
to strict enforcement of sunshine laws. 
This Comment argues that the judicial system should give 
deference to mutually desired secrecy agreements in medical cases.  
Medical products liability cases, in particular, deserve a more 
narrowly tailored approach than most sunshine laws allow.  These 
cases likely involve both strong privacy concerns as well as 
compelling arguments for public disclosure.  While courts should err 
on the side of confidentiality, states can adopt other means of 
disclosing public harms that still uphold the public’s interest in 
protecting private information. 
Part I of this Comment summarizes the arguments for and against 
secrecy in settlements, and the particular benefits of secrecy in 
medical cases.  Part II provides an overview of the Dalkon Shield 
cases and focuses primarily on the competing interests of the 
claimants, the defendants, and the public.  Part III explains how 
settled cases can avoid public disclosure in states without sunshine 
laws and how sunshine laws alter these procedures.  It also examines 
some important components of four states’ sunshine laws and then 
applies those principles to the Dalkon Shield example to show how 
these laws fail to protect privacy in medical cases.  Finally, Part IV 
proposes three alternative methods of protecting the public from harm 
while minimizing the effect on claimants with legitimate privacy 
interests. 
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I 
SECRECY ISSUES 
A.  Settlement and Secrecy in General 
Secrecy in settlement agreements faces harsh criticism, despite the 
fact that the majority of states do not prohibit it.  Commentators have 
challenged settlement agreements in general for reasons that apply to 
the secret settlement debate as well.  Settlement has been accused of 
slowing the evolution of the law by preventing certain legal issues 
from being adjudicated.16  Choosing to settle robs society of 
important factual information, especially in cases affecting the 
“public good.”17  For these commentators, the court’s role in shaping 
law and disclosing wrongdoing outweighs the individual interests of 
parties.18 
Some arguments against secrecy highlight the public function of 
the judicial system.19  Secret settlements, especially those filed in 
court, undermine the values of open government.20  Parties convert 
their private agreements into public documents when they seek 
approval or enforcement of settlement by a court.21  A court is 
“designed primarily to serve the public at large, . . . to produce public 
goods such as court precedents, legal rules, and factual accounts of 
contested events, and not private goods such as settlements . . . .”22  
Lastly, secrecy is especially troubling when it hides repetitive bad 
behavior and risks to the public.23 
 
16 See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087–90 (1984) (arguing 
that all cases, but particularly “significant” cases like Brown v. Board of Education, should 
avoid settlement); David Luban, Settlement and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. 
L.J. 2619, 2621–40 (1995) (articulating arguments in support of adjudication, including its 
ability to produce rules and precedents). 
17 Luban, supra note 16, at 2622–26. 
18 Fiss, supra note 16, at 1089; Koniak, supra note 4, at 789–90. 
19 Luban, supra note 16, at 2642. 
20 Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the 
Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 778–79 (2004). 
21 Zitrin, supra note 8, at 123; Abner J. Mikva, The Role of Judges in Secret 
Judgements, 55 S.C. L. REV. 773, 773 (2003–2004) (stating that having a secret agreement 
with your neighbor “is fine” but “when you ask to have a judge put his imprimatur on [an] 
agreement . . . it enters the public domain”). 
22 Koniak, supra note 4, at 790. 
23 Other arguments against secret settlement include: that later claimants may be less 
likely to attain the same settlement as early claimants, that secrecy hides repetitive 
misbehavior, that it is unethical to allow bad actors to buy silence, and that public courts 
should not be asked to validate or enforce the arrangements of private parties.  Drahozal & 
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However, a claimant’s ability to choose settlement, and even secret 
settlement, remains largely unrestricted in most jurisdictions.  Many 
commentators applaud the choice to put a client’s interests above the 
public’s interest in disclosure.24  As a practical matter, codes of 
professional conduct compel lawyers to settle if their clients so 
choose.25  Courts also encourage settlement,26 some even allow 
judges to serve as mediators rather than force every case into the 
courtroom.27  These realities reflect the judiciary’s tendency to 
respect client autonomy.  Supporting a client’s decision to keep his or 
her settlement secret by filing it under seal or agreeing to a 
confidentiality clause gives deference to the party’s wishes.28  Despite 
the potential for abuse, secrecy allows parties to protect legitimately 
confidential information, like medical records or trade secrets,29 
which serves as a useful and necessary counterbalance to liberal 
discovery rules.30  Allowing for secret settlements may promote 
settlement in general; thus increasing judicial efficiency while 
 
Hines, supra note 4, at 1474; see also Alison Lothes, Comment, Quality, Not Quantity: An 
Analysis of Confidential Settlements and Litigants’ Economic Incentives, 154 U. PA. L. 
REV. 433, 449–51 (2005) (showing that defendants can hide information from the public 
by buying silence from claimants) (citing Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 
Hush Money, 30 RAND J. ECON. 661 (1999)). 
24 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical 
and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995); Jeffrey 
R. Seul, Settling Significant Cases, 79 WASH. L. REV. 881 (2004). 
25 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2007). 
26 See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (“In short, settlements rather than 
litigation will serve the interests of plaintiffs as well as defendants.”); Marc Galanter & 
Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1342–43 (1994). 
27 Galanter & Cahill, supra note 26, at 1354–55. 
28 As mentioned, the Model Rules compel this deference as well.  MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a). 
29 See Drahozal & Hines, supra note 4 at 1465–66 (describing legitimate personal 
privacy interests as well as commercial privacy interests). 
30 Miller & Wright, supra note 20, at 778; Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy by Consent: The 
Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
283, 326 (1999) (“The extraordinarily broad scope of discovery necessitates the 
availability of confidentiality agreements and discovery protective orders.  As currently 
framed, the discovery regime often requires production of voluminous amounts of 
arguably private or sensitive information concerning parties and nonparties alike that 
would not otherwise be subject to compelled public disclosure and that might ultimately 
prove inadmissible.”); see also Luban, supra note 16, at 2649–50 (describing controversy 
over the use of protective orders authorized under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)). 
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avoiding costly trials.31  Without the possibility of secrecy, some 
commentators worry that settlement will be chilled, litigation will 
increase, and the high costs that go with litigation will unduly burden 
those who seek legal remedies.32 
Until recently, the court’s ability to allow secrecy in settlements 
was largely unchecked.33  Secrecy is accomplished in primarily two 
ways: private agreements to keep matters secret, often accompanied 
by compensation from the defendant, or court documents filed under 
seal.34  However, since Florida first passed its “Sunshine in Litigation 
Act” in 1990, several jurisdictions have adopted similar laws 
regulating secret agreements.35  For example, the U.S. District Court 
of South Carolina recently joined this trend in 2004.36  Thirty-two 
federal districts have rules regarding how long settlements may 
remain sealed.37  Twelve districts require a showing of good cause 
 
31 Miller & Wright, supra note 20; see also Lothes, supra note 23, at 452–57 (for an 
interesting analysis of the theory that openness in settlement is also costly to defendants 
who must defend a greater number of nonmeritorious “nuisance suits” and provide larger 
payouts). 
32 Miller & Wright, supra note 20; see also Drahozal & Hines, supra note 4, at 1466–72 
(analyzing the merits of the “chilling settlements” argument); James E. Rooks, Jr., 
Settlements and Secrets: Is the Sunshine Chilly?, 55 S.C. L. REV. 859, 867–68 (2004) 
(quoting insurance groups and defense attorneys making “chilling settlements” arguments 
in opposition to South Carolina federal district court rule, D.S.C. LOCAL R. 5.03).  But see 
Anderson, supra note 6, at 726 (“Statistics compiled since the implementation of [South 
Carolina’s District Court] Local Rule 5.03(c) easily refute this [chilling settlement] 
argument.  In South Carolina, the judges in our district court actually tried two fewer cases 
in the twelve months following the promulgation of Local Rule 5.03(c) than they did in the 
immediately preceding twelve-month period.”). 
 Other arguments in support of secret settlements include: that because secrecy has a 
market value, plaintiffs may have a “property” interest in the material that they discover in 
the course of a lawsuit; that if all settlements were public, later claimants would bring 
frivolous claims having knowledge of a potential defendant and the amount they were 
willing to settle for; and that some prefer autonomy through private agreements over 
government involvement.  See Drahozal & Hines, supra note 4, at 1464–76. 
33 See Richard A. Zitrin, The Laudable South Carolina Court Rules Must Be 
Broadened, 55 S.C. L. REV. 883, 889–91 (2004) (showing states’ efforts to address secret 
settlements and noting “[i]n the last five years, secrecy in settlements has become an 
increasingly common subject of articles in the popular legal press”). 
34 Drahozal & Hines, supra note 4, at 1458.  Filing a document “under seal” means that 
the document is “available to the litigants and may be reviewed by the court in deciding an 
issue before it, but [is] not available to the public.”  Anderson, supra note 6, at 713. 
35 Drahozal & Hines, supra note 4, at 1476–79. 
36 Id. at 1479. 
37 REAGAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 2–3; see also, e.g., D. OR. LOCAL R. 3.11 (2008) 
(stating that parties have sixty days after closing a case to have the sealed document 
returned to the party, or it is unsealed). 
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before sealing.38  At least twelve states have or are considering strong 
restrictions on sealed settlements, especially in cases involving 
“public safety” or “public hazards.”39  Further, Texas restricts private 
settlement agreements as well as filed settlements.40 
These restrictions generally take the following forms: 
1. A presumption, sometimes based on common law, that certain 
court records are open to the public, especially records of 
“substantive action by the court;”41 
2. Narrow restrictions on the use of protective orders in 
discovery;42 
3. Good cause requirements for sealing court files;43 
4. Requiring public hearings before sealing court files;44 
5. Forbidding secret settlements that involve a “public  hazard;”45 
6. Forbidding secret settlements filed in court,46 and  sometimes 
unfiled private settlements;47 and 
7. Making confidentiality clauses in unfiled settlement contracts 
per se void as against public policy if the agreement conceals a 
public hazard.48 
Allowing parties to privately agree to secrecy is less regulated than 
secrecy in court documents.  This makes sense because these 
agreements are entirely private contracts.  Moreover, the court’s 
ability to regulate these agreements, if even possible at all, is likely 
minimal.  Court-supported secrecy, however, receives a higher degree 
of scrutiny.49  Parties that bring their agreements to court to ensure its 
 
38 REAGAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 3; Zitrin, supra note 33, at 890. 
39 Berkeley Rice, Malpractice: The Big Secret About Confidential Settlements, MED. 
ECON., Apr. 25, 2003, available at http://medicaleconomics.modernmedicine 
.com/memag/Medical+Malpractice%3A+:+Awards%2FSettlements/Malpractice 
-The-big-secret-about-confidential-sett/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/111356. 
40 TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(2) (2008). 
41 Drahozal & Hines, supra note 4, at 1476; REAGAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 1. 
42 Drahozal & Hines, supra note 4, at 1476. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 See, e.g., Sunshine in Litigation Act, FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2004). 
46 See, e.g., D.S.C. LOCAL R. 5.03 (2008). 
47 See, e.g., TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a (2008). 
48 James E. Rooks, Jr., Let the Sun Shine in: ‘Sunshine’ Laws Do Not ‘Chill’ 
Settlements Say Advocates of Open Courts, TRIAL 20, June 2003, available at 
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-21046177_ITM. 
49 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 6; Mikva, supra note 21. 
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enforceability add a public aspect to their agreement.50  In such 
instances, the court must balance its public role in developing law and 
revealing societal harms with its role in resolving disputes between 
individual parties. 
B.  Secret Settlements in Medical Cases 
In certain medical cases, the public function of the court seems to 
justify abolishing secrecy.  If a doctor has been negligent in the past, 
future patients should be informed.  Keeping medical malpractice 
claims open to the public is one way of informing the public.  
Alternatively, medical malpractice can be regulated by medical 
licensing boards, hospitals, and through federal reporting 
requirements.51  Doctors who act negligently may be one-time 
offenders, could correct their behavior relatively quickly, or could be 
dealt with individually.  Medical products liability cases present a 
tougher case for the secret settlement debate than medical malpractice 
cases do.  Medical products reach a vastly larger population than do 
individual doctors.  The harm posed to the public may rise to the level 
of a “public hazard” as sunshine laws define the term.52  Defective 
medical products almost always cause bodily harm, and many 
products cause death.  Yet at the same time, medical products cases 
often involve deeply personal components that claimants legitimately 
seek to keep private.  These serious concerns arose not only in the 
Dalkon Shield cases of the 1970s and ’80s, but also in the cases 
involving the drug Vioxx, the diet-drug cocktail called “fen-phen,” 
and silicone breast implants.53 
 
50 See sources cited in supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
51 Federal reporting requirements provide medical malpractice claim information to 
medical boards, hospitals, and other health care entities.  However, the general public has 
no access to this information.  Rice, supra note 39; see also infra Part IV.A (critiquing the 
federal reporting requirements). 
52 See FLA. STAT. § 69.081(2) (2004) (defining public hazard); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 4.24.611(1)(a) (2005) (same). 
53 For more on these cases and similar products cases, see Wendy Wagner, When All 
Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 714–20 
(2007) (on the role of litigation in disclosing important information about risky products, 
in particular, breast implants); Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic 
Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 908 n.167 (2007) (citing 
Alex Berenson, In the Money, and in Court; Drug Industry Braces for New Suits over 
Even More of Its Products, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2006, at C1 (reporting some of these 
settlements: “Wyeth has spent $15 billion . . . to resolve lawsuits over its fen-phen diet-
drug combination, which can cause severe heart problems . . . .  [A]nalysts estimate that 
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This Comment focuses on medical products liability cases and their 
relationship to sunshine laws.54  It also addresses medical malpractice 
claims insofar as they share similar considerations.  They too invoke 
legitimate privacy interests and create a serious threat to the public 
health and safety, albeit a smaller threat.  As a case example, the 
Dalkon Shield litigation demonstrates the combination of issues that 
arise in medical cases: privacy, the public interest, and widespread 
harm to other individuals. 
Medical cases require a close look at various considerations before 
deciding whether public disclosure should prevail over privacy.  
Certain factors weigh in favor of disclosure: a high degree of harm 
from the product, the risk of death,55 a high likelihood that unknown 
third parties will be harmed, and the risk that a secret settlement will 
hide the harm from others.56  Conversely, other considerations either 
favor secrecy or make secrecy a nonissue.  For example, a high 
likelihood that other patients will discover the harm through the 
media or other channels, indications that the harm was particular to a 
single claimant and not widespread,57 and instances when negligent 
parties have already taken remedial measures to avoid future harm.  
The strongest factor in support of secrecy in medical cases is privacy.  
On balance, courts should err on the side of confidentiality in medical 
cases. 
 
Merck may eventually have to pay $10 billion to $50 billion to end the litigation over 
Vioxx, which has been linked to heart attacks and strokes.”)). 
54 The term “medical cases” in this Comment will generally refer to medical products 
liability cases, though I recognize that other medically related claims like malpractice 
share similar themes and concerns. 
55 Medical cases make up two-thirds of all wrongful death claims. THOMAS H. COHEN 
& STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, 
CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 2001: CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN 
LARGE COUNTIES, 2001, at 8 (2004), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ctcvlc01.pdf; 
see also Consumers Union, supra note 5 (alleging that secrecy orders put people at risk of 
death). 
56 For an argument that media channels may adequately reveal harm from medical 
products, see Moss, supra note 53, at 907–09. 
57 For instance, some medical products produce negative side effects either because of 
other medications a patient is taking or because of a patient’s genetic predisposition that 
could not be anticipated.  See John T. Nockelby, How to Manufacture a Crisis: Evaluating 
Empirical Claims Behind “Tort Reform,” 86 OR. L. REV. 533, 568–69 (noting that no two 
medical malpractice cases are the same and that medical claimants’ injuries vary widely). 
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1.  Medical Cases Invoke Different Considerations that Justify 
Secrecy in Settlement 
Medical cases, perhaps more than any other personal injury claim, 
tend to end in settlement because of the complex issues involved and 
the difficulties facing both parties at a trial.58  Claimants in both 
medical malpractice and medical products cases tend to choose 
settlement at a higher rate.59  In 2001, the life of a medical 
malpractice case averaged 33.2 months, making them the second-
longest trials of all tort cases.60  Products liability cases were 
longest.61  Medical products cases usually fit into one or both of these 
categories.  Many medical claimants cannot wait this long for 
compensation, especially if they are suffering injuries, out of work, or 
without health care.62 
Doctors, drug manufacturers, and other medical defendants also 
have compelling reasons for settlement.  Even when culpability 
remains uncertain, many defendants would rather avoid the 
embarrassment of a public trial.63  Just being in court can be 
damaging even to a company’s name or doctor’s reputation, even if 
innocent.64  Settlement allows defendants a certain amount of privacy 
and expediency in resolving claims.  Secret settlement prevents others 
from knowing how much a claimant was given in damages and what 
medical details prompted the claim.65 
 
58 Rice, supra note 39; see also TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 68–
69 (2005). 
59 Online Lawyer Source, Medical Malpractice Settlements, http://www 
.onlinelawyersource.com/medical_malpractice/settlements.html (last visited Dec. 23, 
2008) (stating that medical malpractice suits settle ninety-six percent of the time); cf. 
Robert J. Rhee, Tort Arbitrage, 60 FLA. L. REV. 125, 157 (2008) (“The assumption is that 
of all cases, 72% are settled, 8% are tried, and 20% are disposed of through pretrial 
dismissals.”).  For more on why medical cases settle, see Philip G. Peters, Jr., What We 
Know About Malpractice Settlements, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1783, 1808–12 (2007). 
60 COHEN & SMITH, supra note 55, at 8.  This data does not even account for the 
appeals process. 
61 Id. at 6.  Like the Dalkon Shield cases, a medical products case can be categorized as 
either a medical malpractice case or a products liability case. 
62 Rice, supra note 39. 
63 Peters, supra note 59, at 1786 (showing that even in cases with weak claims or little 
evidentiary support, defendants still settle ten to twenty percent of cases). 
64 Rice, supra note 39. 
65 Id.  Medical defendants’ arguments in support of secrecy gain strength when the 
medical problem at issue is unique to the individual claimant and not likely to be of 
general concern, or when the claim is frivolous.  But, of course, there is no readily 
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Hospitals, also frequent medical defendants, have legitimate 
reasons for using settlement to preserve both their reputations and the 
reputations of their doctors.  They may have remedial procedures in 
place to deal with tort claims when they arise.  In addition to in-house 
procedures, federal law requires the payers of medical malpractice 
claims to report the payments to their state’s licensing board and other 
regulators.66  The report must include the name of the doctor and 
hospital, the amount of the payment, and a description of the acts and 
injuries giving rise to the claim.67  However, federal law does not 
mandate that this report be accessible to the general public.68 
A medical product manufacturer may have a legitimate privacy 
interest as well.  Manufacturers likely have a strong interest in 
keeping their trade secrets private.  A manufacturer may be able to 
cure certain product flaws, recall the defective product, or adequately 
warn consumers in time. 
Medical manufacturers also assert what scholars call the “FDA 
defense.”69  Because the FDA strictly regulates medical products, the 
need for discovering harms through the legal system should be 
 
apparent way of distinguishing such cases from the rest.  However, since such cases do 
exist, defendants’ interest in privacy is not wholly unjustified. 
66 Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131, 11133 (2005). 
67 Id. § 11131. 
68 Rice, supra note 39. 
69 “Many commentators assert that the FDA standards are the most stringent standards 
in the world, and that compliance with these standards is extremely time consuming and 
expensive.”  Annette L. Marthaler, Comment, The FDA Defense: A Prescription for 
Easing the Pain of Punitive Damage Awards in Medical Products Liability Cases, 19 
HAMLINE L. REV. 451, 453 (1996). 
 A recent Supreme Court opinion seems to have adopted this view.  In that case, the 
defendants successfully argued that the FDA “preempted” a claim against an allegedly 
defective medical product so that the claimant had no recourse in court.  Riegel v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1013 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The [Medical 
Device Amendment’s] preemption clause, the Court holds, spares medical device 
manufacturers from personal injury claims alleging flaws in a design or label once the 
application for the design or label has gained premarket approval from the [FDA]; a state 
damages remedy, the Court instructs, persists only for claims ‘premised on a violation of 
FDA regulations.’” (citation omitted)).  Though it is beyond the scope of this Comment, 
the opinion raises concerns over whether most medical products cases can be litigated at 
all, thus giving injured potential claimants very few options.  For a critical take on this 
case, see Editorial, The Dangers in Pre-emption, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/14/opinion/14mon2.html (“If this perverse legal 
doctrine, known as federal pre-emption, continues to spread, the public will be deprived of 
a vital tool for policing companies and unearthing documents that reveal their 
machinations.”). 
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small.70  Furthermore, inspecting, regulating, and warning the public 
about harmful medical products should be the job of a government 
agency, not the courts.  In any case, however strict the initial 
regulations are, the FDA does not require drug manufacturers to 
report hazards once the company knows of them.71  This lack of 
oversight supports the opposing argument for openness in settlement 
and the need for public disclosure of allegedly harmful products. 
Plaintiffs, arguably, have the strongest claim for privacy.  Plaintiffs 
often share a great deal of personal information in the course of their 
case.  Though some disclosure is necessary based on the nature of the 
claim, some defendants abuse discovery to harass or scare claimants 
away.  For instance, the Dalkon Shield defense counsel interrogated 
women about their sexual history and personal hygiene only to 
uncover information with no bearing on the cases whatsoever.72  One 
can imagine similarly embarrassing questioning of the claimants in 
the fen-phen diet-drug cases or silicone breast implant cases. 
Patients should have the option to protect their personal privacy.  
The law upholds the privacy of medical information.  The Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”),73 for 
example, is a highly restrictive federal law that prohibits disclosing 
patients’ files and protected health information.  HIPAA regulations 
reflect what society holds to be true: medical information is highly 
 
70 See Marthaler, supra note 69, at 453.  But see Wagner, supra note 53, at 696–701 
(highlighting the ways in which the legal system can be used to obtain vital information 
from product manufacturers that federal agencies like the FDA often fail to obtain). 
71 PERRY & DAWSON, supra note 15, at 239. 
72 BACIGAL, supra note 9, at 18–20; see also MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: 
CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN AND THE DALKON SHIELD 194–97 (1985) (detailing several 
irrelevant questions); Lord, supra note 14, at 28–30 (explaining A.H. Robins’s inability to 
establish causation with this line of questioning); Worsham v. A.H. Robins Co., 734 F.2d 
676, 681, 691 (11th Cir. 1984) (one case in which A.H. Robins raised this theory of 
alternative liability and failed). 
73 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 
110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 1320d-2 and 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 
164).  HIPAA reads in part: 
Each person . . . who maintains or transmits health information shall maintain 
reasonable and appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards —  
(A) to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the information; 
(B) to protect against any reasonably anticipated —  
(i) threats or hazards to the security or integrity of the information; and 
(ii) unauthorized uses or disclosures of the information; and 
(C) otherwise to ensure compliance with this part by the officers and employees 
of such person. 
42 U.S.C. 1320d-2(d)(2). 
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private and deserves the utmost protection.  Courts have found that 
disclosure of certain medical records can violate a plaintiff’s 
constitutional right to privacy.74  One court sanctioned a defendant for 
unlawfully obtaining medical information that included sexual history 
because it was of “such a private and personal nature” that the 
defendant’s behavior “unquestionably offend[ed] those ‘basic and 
fundamental rights’ which we consider so ‘deeply rooted in our 
society’ as to directly bear on our privacy rights.”75  Besides HIPPA 
and a constitutional right to privacy, the doctor-patient privilege also 
reflects the law’s reverence for medical privacy.76 
Female patients in particular have strong interests in protecting 
privacy in medical cases.  Because medical cases often involve 
women, sunshine laws place greater burdens on women seeking 
secrecy.  Women consume more medical products, and consequently, 
are more often injured by medical products and the medical system.77  
Historically, medical products have posed greater risks to women 
because the regulatory system did not adequately test products for 
 
74 See, e.g., Mann v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 152 F.R.D. 119 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (citing other 
federal and Supreme Court cases as well). 
75 Id. at 126. 
76 While the specific doctor-patient privilege is governed by state or common law, the 
federal rules protect privileged information generally.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
77 See Dolly M. Trompeter, Comment, Sex, Drugs, and the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts, Section 6(c): Why Comment E is the Answer to the Woman Question, 48 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1139, 1143 & n.10 (1999) (citing LESLIE LAURENCE & BETH WEINHOUSE, 
OUTRAGEOUS PRACTICES: THE ALARMING TRUTH ABOUT HOW MEDICINE MISTREATS 
WOMEN 295 (1994) (noting that “[w]omen take more prescription drugs than men and buy 
more over-the-counter medications for themselves and their families”); L. Elizabeth 
Bowles, Note, The Disfranchisement of Fertile Women in Clinical Trials: The Legal 
Ramifications of and Solutions for Rectifying the Knowledge Gap, 45 VAND. L. REV. 877, 
878 (1992) (discussing the fact that women consume more prescription drugs than men 
and suffer a disproportionate number of side effects from these drugs); Linda Marsa, The 
Breast Implant Backlash, WORKING WOMAN, Apr. 1, 1996, at 46, 76 (noting one survey 
that revealed that “of all women winning punitive awards in any kind of trial, nearly 70% 
were injured by defective drugs or medical devices”)).  One small survey showed a fifty-
eight percent to forty-two percent gender difference between potential medical claimants, 
women being more frequent.  LaRae I. Huycke and Mark M. Huycke, Characteristics of 
Potential Plaintiffs in Malpractice Litigation, 120 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 792, tbl.2 
(1994), available at http://www.annals.org/cgi/content/full/120/9/792. 
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women.78  The full inclusion of female patients in medical research 
remains a topic of concern to this day.79 
Women also bring claims that are particularly personal in nature.  
Women have been the victims of defective contraceptive products,80 
feminine hygiene products (e.g., tampons), breast implantation 
devices, and negligent birthing practices.81  Frequently, women’s 
medical cases involve damages that are difficult to quantify, including 
“sexual or reproductive harm, pregnancy loss[,] . . . impaired fertility 
or sexual functioning, miscarriage, incontinence, trauma associated 
with sexual relationships, and scarring or disfigurement in sensitive, 
intimate areas of the body.”82 
Some commentators have questioned whether the courts take such 
unquantifiable claims brought by women as seriously as other claims 
 
78 See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY 
AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982); Bowles, supra note 77, at 878.  Notably, the 
Dalkon Shield IUD was never adequately tested for safety in women before it began to be 
marketed.  MINTZ, supra note 72, at 69–70. 
79 See Jesselyn Clair S. Pe, Note, Gender Issues in Health Research and the Impact of 
the Women’s Health Office Act of 2005 on Women’s Health, 28 WOMEN’S RTS L. REP. 
127, 127 (2007) (“More recent changes in the FDA’s drug approval requirements have 
brought about increased female enrollment in clinical research, but such changes have not 
been routinely implemented across all drug research studies . . . .”); Vicki Lawrence 
MacDougall, Medical Gender Bias and Managed Care, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 781 
(2002). 
80 The contraceptive market produced the Dalkon Shield and the Ortho Evra birth 
control patch have both been the subject of recent litigation.  See Gardiner Harris and Alex 
Berenson, Drug Makers Near Old Goal: A Legal Shield, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/06/ washington/06patch.html.  Unlike male 
methods, women often use contraceptives for several years of their lives and for various 
reasons.  See WebMD, Birth Control Methods, http://www.webmd.com/sex/birth-
control/birth-control-birth-control          -methods (last visited Feb. 5, 2009) (one IUD, for 
example, can be used for five to ten years; other reasons for using birth control include 
controlling acne and reducing premenstrual symptoms). 
81 Certain feminine hygiene products have been shown to cause toxic shock syndrome, 
which resulted in litigation.  See Hayes v. Playtex Family Prods. Corp., 168 F.R.D. 292 
(D. Kan. 1996) (requesting class certification); Haddix v. Playtex Family Prods. Corp., 
138 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 1998); Papike v. Tambrands, Inc., 107 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 1997).  
Breast implant litigation was the source of a great deal of controversy in the 1980s and 
’90s.  See Wagner, supra note 53, at 714–17.  Many medical malpractice claims are 
brought by women against obstetricians/gynecologists (OB/GYN) for injuries sustained 
during childbirth.  Rich Lowry, “Suing the OB-GYNs: Our Legal System Doesn’t Exactly 
Welcome Life Into the World,” NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Aug. 20, 2004), available at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/lowry/lowry200408201007.asp  (“On average, OB-GYNs 
have 2.6 claims filed against them during their careers.”). 
82 Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victims of Tort Reform: Women, Children, and the 
Elderly, 53 EMORY L.J. 1263, 1266 (2004). 
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that involve private information, like trade secrets.83  Judge Lord, in 
his Reprimand of the Dalkon Shield defendants, noted that “women . . 
. seem through some strange quirk of our society’s mores to be 
expected to suffer pain, suffering and humiliation.”84  In medical 
cases involving women, it is likely that the empathy for women’s 
privacy would be somewhat diminished by society’s perception that 
using products like birth control or tampons is a choice and women 
assume the risks from that choice. 
Sunshine laws require judges to make value judgments about what 
information deserves protection from the public, which claims are 
legitimate, and which are merely self-serving.  Women’s general 
credibility in court is sometimes perceived as being less than men’s.85  
As a result, women’s concerns, especially their unquantifiable claims, 
have often been sidelined.86  Thus, sunshine laws put difficult 
obstacles in the way of privacy that disproportionately burden female 
claimants. 
II 
THE DALKON SHIELD CASE EXAMPLE 
The Dalkon Shield cases present a thought-provoking example of 
conflicting individual interests that have a high degree of public 
interest.  The intrauterine contraceptive device (“IUD”), the Dalkon 
Shield, was introduced by the A.H. Robins Company in 1971.87  
 
83 Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform for Women, 64 
TENN. L. REV. 847, 849–50 (1996–1997) (arguing that the societal devaluation of women 
is reflected in the tort system); see also Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her 
Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1, 8–10 (1995) 
(highlighting several examples of gender bias in tort law including smaller damages 
awards because “male work and lives are valued higher than female work and lives”). 
84 Lord, supra note 14, at 9. 
85 Lynn Hecht Schafran, Credibility in the Courts: Why Is There a Gender Gap?, 34 
JUDGES’ J., Winter 1995; see also Finley, supra note 82, at 1266 (“These priceless aspects 
of life [including women’s reproductive health] hold little economic worth in the market” 
and consequently, women tend to recover less in damages.). 
86 Schafran, supra note 85, at 5.  Take for instance, the disparate treatment of women’s 
punitive damage awards and their compensation for emotional injury.  See Leslie Bender, 
An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 575, 577–79 (1993) 
(discussing the historical trend in tort law to discount “emotional” injuries, more often 
claimed by women); Finley, supra note 83, at 858–61 (addressing the tort system’s 
characterization of reproductive harm suffered by women as an emotional harm ultimately 
resulting in smaller pecuniary damage awards); Koenig & Rustad, supra note 83, at 6 
(examining patterns of punitive damages and concluding that “awards are subdivided into 
‘his’ and ‘her’ tort worlds”). 
87 PERRY & DAWSON, supra note 15, at 67. 
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Almost immediately, female patients reported injuries caused by the 
defective product.88  Like other IUDs, the Dalkon Shield was 
composed of a plastic part, the “body,”89 which a doctor inserts into 
the uterus, and is connected by a “tail string” that extends into the 
vagina and allows for removal.90  The Dalkon Shield, however, had 
the proclivity to cause pelvic inflammatory disease (“PID”) because 
of a “wicking” effect in the tail string caused by its cotton strands, 
which provided a pathway for bacteria to enter the uterus.91  The 
Dalkon Shield also carried a high risk of septic abortions if the 
woman became pregnant while using it, and approximately 110,000 
women did.92  Both septic abortions and PID can cause sterility or 
death.93  Eighteen women died from PID caused by the Dalkon Shield 
in the United States alone.94 
A.H. Robins marketed the Dalkon Shield widely in the United 
States95 and abroad96 through the early 1970s.  Because an IUD is 
inserted into the uterus once and keeps working for several years, the 
makers touted the Dalkon Shield’s potential to virtually erase the 
 
88 The first legal report was made in 1972, but most early claims resulted in small 
settlements.  Id. at 160, 173. 
89 Id. at 14–15. 
90 MINTZ, supra note 72, at 131. 
91 See Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 196 (Colo. 1984).  For more 
explanation of the tail string, see PERRY & DAWSON, supra note 15, at 79–88.  For an 
illustration of the device, see id. at 15 and MINTZ, supra note 72, at 140. 
92 MINTZ, supra note 72, at 3.  Approximately 66,000 of the 110,000 women who 
became pregnant while using the Dalkon Shield suffered septic abortions.  BACIGAL, 
supra note 9, at 3; see, e.g., Palmer, 684 P.2d at 196.  A septic abortion is a kind of 
spontaneous or “infected miscarriage” which can sometimes be fatal.  MINTZ, supra note 
72, at 4.  Many pregnant women using the Dalkon Shield faced a difficult choice between 
a voluntary abortion or continuing with the pregnancy and risking this painful (and likely) 
outcome.  See, e.g., Palmer, 684 P.2d at 196–97 (Carie Palmer); MINTZ, supra note 72, at 
9–12 (Peggy Mample and Joan Smith); PERRY & DAWSON, supra note 15, at 155–59 
(Cynthia Parker). 
93 MINTZ, supra note 72, at 156–57.  Other harm from the product includes birth 
defects, still birth, and perforation of the uterus.  Id. at 8–10, 13; PERRY & DAWSON, supra 
note 15, at 160–62. 
94 MINTZ, supra note 72, at 3, 4–5 (in some parts of the world, poor medical conditions 
made complications like PID more likely to be fatal). 
95 Hawkinson v. A.H. Robins Co., 595 F. Supp. 1290, 1299, 1307 (1984); BACIGAL, 
supra note 9, at 18; NICOLE J. GRANT, THE SELLING OF CONTRACEPTION: THE DALKON 
SHIELD CASE, SEXUALITY, AND WOMEN’S AUTONOMY 41–48 (1992). 
96 BACIGAL, supra note 9, at 14 (noting that A.H. Robins continued to market the IUD 
abroad even after it stopped sales in the United States). 
 688 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87, 671 
problem of human error and the hassle of once-daily birth control.97  
A.H. Robins called it a “superior” form of birth control,98 “virtually 
100% effective,”99 and perhaps “the safest method of effective 
contraception available.”100  In its first year on the market, the 
company sold more than one million units.101 
With such vast consumer response, and corresponding widespread 
injury, the Dalkon Shield clearly became a topic of general public 
concern.102  Approximately 3.2 million women worldwide suffered 
harm from the product.103  Hundreds of claims were brought, 
including one class action lawsuit that eventually resulted in a $38 
million settlement.104  These numbers do not account for the women’s 
partners and families who were personally affected.  Women brought 
claims for physical injuries to their reproductive systems, unwanted 
pregnancies, their lost ability to bear children, pain and suffering, and 
wrongful death.105  Spouses also brought derivative claims and some 
children of the women had claims for birth defects caused by the 
Shield.106 
Even in its first year of sales, the makers of the Dalkon Shield were 
aware of the product’s risks.107  In 1971, one of the earliest internal 
memos regarding the problems with the Dalkon Shield was ignored as 
sales soared and A.H. Robins struggled to keep up with demand.108  
Several individuals, including plaintiffs’ attorneys, tried to convince 
the company to recall the device or at least to warn doctors of the 
 
97 See PERRY & DAWSON, supra note 15, at 1 (from an A.H. Robins brochure 
remarking that “[b]ecause there is nothing to take, nothing to use, and nothing to 
remember before or after having relations, most women find the Dalkon Shield the safest 
and most satisfying method of contraception”). 
98 MINTZ, supra note 72, at 70. 
99 BACIGAL, supra note 9, at 9. 
100 Hawkinson, 595 F. Supp. at 1305. 
101 Id. at 1300. 
102 It is uncertain whether the product would fall under the term “public hazard” as is 
required by some sunshine laws.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2004). 
103 Id.  For more information regarding the class action suit, see In re A.H. Robins Co., 
880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989). 
104 MINTZ, supra note 72, at 13. 
105 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking the Mass Out of Mass Torts: Reflections of a 
Dalkon Shield Arbitrator on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Judging, Neutrality, Gender, 
and Process, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513, 515 (1998). 
106 Id.; MINTZ, supra note 72, at 10, 13. 
107 MINTZ, supra note 72, at 133. 
108 Id. at 70–71; Palmer, 684 P.2d at 195–96. 
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growing problems; these early attempts were rejected.109  In 1981, the 
company finally sent a letter to doctors “altering [their] 
recommendation” but refusing to acknowledge a connection between 
the device and the thousands of tort claims.110  U.S. District Court 
Judge Lord took an active role in the consolidated Dalkon Shield 
cases111 and strongly advocated, without success, that the company 
“locate each and every woman who still wears this device, and . . . 
recall [its] product.”112 
Judge Lord also criticized A.H. Robins’s failure to present an 
accurate report to the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), 
something that prevented the defective product from early 
detection.113  On top of A.H. Robins’s apparent lies,114 the FDA 
failed to perform its own investigation of the Dalkon Shield for six 
years.115  Though other entities, including medical scientists, offered 
to test the devices, the company actively discouraged these 
attempts.116 
Doctors were also uninformed of the dangerous defects of the 
Dalkon Shield.117  A.H. Robins spent $373,527 on false and 
 
109 In 1977, a leading plaintiff’s lawyer wrote two letters to the executives at A.H. 
Robins urging them to immediately call for the removal of the devices.  MINTZ, supra note 
72, at 19, 207.  About 800,000 women were using the IUD at the time, and most had no 
clue of the danger it posed to them.  Id. at 19.  Not only did the company ignore this 
lawyer’s suggestions, it later tried to silence several lawyers in the litigation with 
conditions in the settlement agreements that the attorney never again represent a Dalkon 
Shield claimant.  Id. at 197–98; Zitrin, supra note 8, at 120.  These types of conditions are 
now illegal under rule 5.6(b) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  See 
MINTZ, supra note 72, at 197. 
110 MINTZ, supra note 72, at 207–08. 
111 BACIGAL, supra note 9, at 23; In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir. 
1989) (summarizing Judge Lord’s role in the cases). 
112 Lord, supra note 14, at 13.  He continued, “The only conceivable reasons you have 
not recalled this product are that it would hurt your balance sheet and alert women, who 
already have been harmed, that you may be liable for their injuries. . . .  This is corporate 
irresponsibility at its meanest.”  Id. at 10–11. 
113 Id. at 13. 
114 MINTZ, supra note 72, at 126–27; PERRY & DAWSON, supra note 15, at 6.  
Inevitably, thousands of women never brought claims; others settled early, many went 
through arbitration, and a few went to trial independent from the class action.  See id. at 
173 (no claim before 1975 went to trial).  Menkel-Meadow, supra note 105, at 518–19. 
115 RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD 
BANKRUPTCY 4, 343 n.5 (1991).  The device was labeled a “device” rather than a “drug” 
like most contraceptives, which at least partially explains the FDA’s lack of initiative.  Id.; 
BACIGAL, supra note 9, at 7–8. 
116 See MINTZ, supra note 72, at 115–23 (chapter 7, “Dodging the FDA”). 
117 See id. at 69–88 (chapter 5, “Deceiving Doctors”). 
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misleading advertising in medical journals.118  Its salesmen, who had 
no background in gynecological products, were encouraged to push 
the product not only in the OB/GYN doctors market, but also toward 
general practitioners who would be less likely to know of inherent 
risks of IUDs and more likely to insert them improperly.119  Several 
physicians, whom A.H. Robins had added as third party defendants, 
were actually driven to cooperate with the plaintiffs because of A.H. 
Robins’s tactics of shifting blame to the doctor and even the 
victim.120 
A.  The Dalkon Shield Litigation’s Effect on Privacy 
The women who brought their claims suffered doubly.  They had 
to relive their painful experiences in the course of litigation,121 and 
were subjected to a demeaning barrage of questioning about their 
bodies and sexual histories.122  In depositions and at trial, A.H. 
Robins pushed their alternative theory of causation by blaming the 
patients for their bacteria-related injuries.123  A.H. Robins suggested 
that the women might have exposed themselves to bacteria and STDs 
by having numerous sexual partners or by practicing poor hygiene.124  
This tactic was aimed at deterring women from pursuing their claims 
 
118 Id. at 69–70. 
119 Id. at 71–72. 
120 BACIGAL, supra note 9, at 20–21.  A.H. Robins blamed doctors for the damage done 
by the Shield, especially in the early litigation.  PERRY & DAWSON, supra note 15, at 172–
73.  Thus, certain doctors would no doubt have a legitimate claim to privacy in resolving 
the cases in which they were named defendants. 
121 Some cases were litigated separately, some as a class, and some settled out of court.  
Others went through an arbitration process when A.H. Robins eventually went bankrupt.  
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 105, at 518–19. 
122 BACIGAL, supra note 9, at 19–21; Worsham v. A.H. Robins Co., 734 F.2d 676, 681 
(1984). 
123 MINTZ, supra note 72, at 194–96; BACIGAL, supra note 9, at 19–20 (listing A.H. 
Robins’s “Dirty Questions List”). 
124 MINTZ, supra note 72, at 194–96. 
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and scaring other women away; it served no legal purpose.125  Sadly, 
in many instances, the tactic worked.126 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, an arbitrator in some of the cases, 
advocated for a more private way of resolving the Dalkon Shield 
mass tort litigation —mediation and settlement.127  She said, “In the 
kind of sensitive cases that comprise many of women’s health issues, 
many individuals want to tell their story . . . , but not necessarily in a 
very public forum.”128  In fact, for many, “the fear of cross-
examination on past sexual history . . . [and] the actual conduct of the 
cross-examination in depositions and trials was experienced as 
another layer of harm.”129  Hundreds of women experienced a public 
trial or the public arbitration process that Ms. Menkel-Meadow 
described.  But several Dalkon Shield claimants settled early, and 
some likely had the option of settling secretly.130  These claimants 
may have agreed to hide a great public health risk, but they likely did 
so, in large part, to protect their privacy. 
III 
SUNSHINE LAWS AND THE DALKON SHIELD 
What is the legal system’s role in warning the public when the 
FDA, corporations, and the medical community fail to prevent a 
 
125 See Worsham, 734 F.2d at 681–82 (plaintiff’s expert testifying that it would be 
“highly unlikely” that STDs were the cause of the plaintiff’s PID); MINTZ, supra note 72, 
at 195 (arguing that even if the women had had multiple sex partners while using the IUD 
or had practiced less than perfect hygiene, “[w]hat could be less surprising . . . ?” or in 
other words, foreseeable?).  Courts in some jurisdictions intervened in the discovery 
process to stop A.H. Robins’s inappropriate questioning, while other courts allowed the 
questioning.  MINTZ, supra note 72, at 195. 
126 Lord, supra note 14, at 27 n.11. 
127 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 105, at 545. 
128 Id. at 531. 
129 Id. at 516–17. 
130 For obvious reasons, there is little evidence of secret settlements between claimants 
and A.H. Robins.  However, the company did make settlement offers to attorneys 
containing confidentiality clauses that would prohibit the attorneys from representing any 
future Dalkon Shield claimants.  MINTZ, supra note 72, at 197.  It also used secrecy to 
hide negative test results revealing the defects in the Dalkon Shield’s design and to prevent 
the information from being disclosed in discovery.  Id. at 198–206.  Based on the 
company’s adversity to public disclosure, it is quite likely that it would utilize 
confidentiality agreements in settlement when possible.  In addition, confidentiality 
agreements are quite common in any settlement.  See Lance P. McMillian, The Nuisance 
Settlement “Problem”: The Elusive Truth and a Clarifying Proposal, 31 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 221, 234–35 (2007) (describing confidentiality agreements as a “near-universal 
provision in any settlement agreement”). 
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defective medical product from getting to the market?  What burden 
should be placed on early plaintiffs who discover dangerous products 
to reveal the danger to others? 
Sunshine in litigation laws aim to disclose dangerous products to 
the public, but in doing so, they burden plaintiffs by requiring 
disclosure to not only the defendant’s alleged wrongdoing, but also 
the plaintiffs’ own personal story.  These laws create unfortunate side 
effects for parties with legitimate privacy interests.  By requiring 
disclosure, sunshine laws risk turning people away from the very 
system that they ought to go to for justice.  When applied broadly, 
they risk decreasing the chance of ever disclosing the public hazards 
that they seek to expose. 
A.  What Is Kept Secret, and How? 
In order to assess how sunshine laws specifically affect  medical 
cases like Dalkon Shield, it is important to understand what types of 
documents these laws apply to, and how the laws disclose information 
to the public. 
Courts receive and produce a variety of documents that may be 
kept secret. 
1.  Discovery 
Courts can issue protective orders providing that discovery 
exchanged between the parties will be kept confidential from anyone 
outside of the litigation.131  Courts may also approve a settlement 
with an order that requires the parties to return all documents 
produced during discovery.132 
2.  The Settlement Agreement133 
Secret settlement agreements usually contain a confidentiality 
clause requiring that the parties and counsel never discuss the case or 
 
131 “A protective order will be issued for good cause [when it is shown] necessary to 
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or 
expense.”  23 AM. JUR. 2D Deposition and Discovery § 63 (2008).  Courts have issued 
protective orders for medical records and strongly enforced them with sanctions.  See, e.g., 
Mann v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 152 F.R.D. 119 (S.D. Ohio 1993). 
132 Anderson, supra note 6, at 713–14. 
133 Settlement agreements include those filed with the court or private contractual 
agreements.  See DRAHOZAL & HINES, supra note 4, at 1458.  A survey of federal district 
courts showed that the most frequently sealed piece of information was the settlement 
amount.  REAGAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 8. 
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share information with individuals outside the case.134  Sometimes 
only certain terms must be kept confidential, such as the settlement 
amount.135  Courts keep settlement agreements secret by enforcing 
these private contracts, or by allowing the agreement to be filed with 
the court “under seal.”136 
3.  Court Documents137 
Courts may seal all documents in the case file including pleadings, 
motions, filed discovery, and court orders.138  Some parties have 
asked for the total destruction of documents filed with the court, 
though this has little chance of happening.139  Some courts allow 
vacating or de-publishing substantive orders previously entered.140 
4.  Other Means of Obtaining Secrecy 
A court may agree to stipulations to change the names of parties so 
they are unrecognizable to the public.141  A court may also close the 
courtroom so that only the parties and court personnel are present.142  
However, a court’s authority to do this may depend on the type of 
 
134 See Emily Fiftal, Note, Respecting Litigants’ Privacy and Public Needs: Striking 
Middle Ground in an Approach to Secret Settlements, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 503, 506 
(2004) (referencing “confidentiality provisions” in settlements). 
135 See Anderson, supra note 6; Miller & Wright, supra note 20, at 778. 
136 See supra note 34 (defining “under seal”). 
137 “Court documents” can include everything filed with the court, including the 
pleadings, filed discovery, motions to compel, other pretrial motions, records of hearings 
or conferences, evidence, jury instructions, and any substantive court orders.  See 
Anderson, supra note 6, at 713–14; see, e.g., D.S.C. LOCAL CIV. R. 7.01 (filing motions); 
see also REAGAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 1 (on substantive court orders).  Notably, 
complaints are rarely sealed.  REAGAN ET AL., supra note 1, at 8.  A survey of federal 
district courts showed that even in cases with sealed settlement agreements, the complaint 
was unsealed ninety-seven percent of the time.  Id. 
138 Substantive court orders, however, are likely subject to the common law 
presumption of openness.  See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
139 Anderson, supra note 6, at 714 n.14 (citing Secrecy and the Courts: The Judges’ 
Perspective, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 169, 193 (2000). 
140 Id. at 713–14. 
141 See Richard A. Zitrin, Open Courts with Sealed Files: Secrecy’s Impact on 
American Justice 9 n.4 (July 29, 2000) (unpublished paper, presented at the 2000 Forum 
for State Appellate Court Judges), available at http://www.roscoepound 
.org/new/00zitrin.pdf (referring to cases involving “professionals who did not want their 
names sullied . . . condition[ing] settlement on such ‘sanitization’”). 
142 Anderson, supra note 6, at 713. 
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hearing or meeting taking place, because courtrooms are typically 
open to the public.143 
In medical cases like Dalkon Shield, the defendants would likely 
seek to keep the following secret: the settlement amount, any 
substantive court orders indicating liability or determining fault, 
certain discovery documents (e.g., “smoking gun” memos or 
documents revealing trade secrets), and even the allegations of 
wrongdoing in the pleadings.  Plaintiffs would be more interested in 
protecting discovery documents of a private nature.  These include 
medical records and deposition transcripts with answers to personal 
questions, any terms of the settlement agreement describing the 
injuries or damages, and perhaps the settlement amount. 
B.  State “Sunshine Laws” and Similar Restrictions on Secrecy 
Sunshine laws vary based on jurisdiction.  Depending on how 
broadly the statute applies, certain documents may or may not be kept 
confidential.  Parties can sometimes keep documents confidential by 
going through procedural hurdles or by arguing that an exception 
applies based on the type of information contained in the 
document.144  Certain aspects of these statutes present particularly 
troublesome consequences when applied to medical cases like Dalkon 
Shield.  These components are described below by examining four 
jurisdictions’ sunshine laws. 
The Federal District of South Carolina passed Local Rule 5.03 in 
2004, which reads as an outright ban on sealing settlement 
agreements.145  However, the court may suspend the ban for “good 
cause.”146  The good cause exception in this jurisdiction appears to 
extend to both business and privacy interests.  Judge Anderson of the 
South Carolina District Court stated that a court may agree to seal a 
settlement to protect proprietary interests or trade secrets, or when “a 
particularly vulnerable party needs to be shielded from the glare of an 
otherwise newsworthy settlement.”147  Other court documents may be 
sealed at the court’s discretion when certain procedural hurdles are 
 
143 Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the 
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 429 (1991) (explaining that the “right of public access to 
court proceedings” is well rooted in the common law). 
144 See infra Part III.C.3. 
145 D.S.C. LOCAL CIV. R. 5.03(E) (2008); see also Zitrin, supra note 33, at 884. 
146 D.S.C. LOCAL CIV. R. 1.02. 
147 Anderson, supra note 6, at 723. 
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overcome, including providing a description of the documents filed in 
a motion to seal, with public notice of the motion.148 
The district court rule has one exception: private settlement 
agreements not filed in court are unaffected by the sunshine law.149  
This exception for private settlement agreements contrasts with the 
Texas statute on secret settlements, which applies a strong 
presumption of openness to all “court records.”150  “Court records” 
includes documents filed with the court, “settlement agreements not 
filed of record,” and any discovery documents concerning “matters 
that have a probable adverse effect upon the general public health or 
safety.”151  This broad definition of court records allows Texas courts 
to require open disclosure of nearly every document in the case.  The 
courts have found an exception for unfiled discovery documents, 
however.152 
One problem facing statutes like Texas’s is determining what 
qualifies as matters that affect the “public health or safety.”153  The 
Texas statute does not define this phrase.154  Washington has a statute 
that similarly limits secrecy in “product liability” and “hazardous 
substance” claims.155  Washington’s definition expressly includes 
personal injury claims involving products that present “an alleged risk 
of similar injury” to others.156  In hindsight, the Dalkon Shield device 
clearly fits within this definition.  Early in the course of the litigation, 
however, patients are less likely to perceive the widespread threat of 
harm.  Medical products can react with certain patients in ways that 
would never affect other patients.  Thus, this definition of a “hazard” 
 
148 See D.S.C. LOCAL CIV. R. 1.02.  Other procedural hurdles are explained, infra Part 
III.C.3. 
149 See D.S.C. LOCAL CIV. R. 5.03 (“Nothing in this Rule limits the ability of the 
parties, by agreement, to restrict access to documents which are not filed with the Court.”); 
see also S.C. R. CIV. P. 41.1 (2003) (a similar state statute that provides “[t]his Rule does 
not apply to private settlement agreements”).  Because of these and other loopholes, these 
rules have been criticized as being too permissive of secrecy in general.  See Zitrin, supra 
note 33, at 885. 
150 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a. 
151 Id. 
152 Gen. Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tex. 1998) (may not include trade 
secrets); In re Dallas Morning News, Inc., 10 S.W.3d 298 (Tex. 1999).  For interpretation, 
see generally Upjohn Co. v. Freeman, 906 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. App. 1995). 
153 TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1)(a)(2). 
154 See id. 
155 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.611(1)(a) (West 2005). 
156 Id. 
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creates doubt as to whether medical products cases would be subject 
to Washington’s secrecy limitations. 
Florida’s Sunshine in Litigation Act prohibits courts from allowing 
the concealment of a “public hazard.”157  That statute defines “public 
hazard” as “an instrumentality, including but not limited to any 
device, instrument, person, procedure . . . or product . . . that has 
caused and is likely to cause injury.”158  The Florida courts have not 
concretely defined what is included in this broad definition.159  For 
instance, a tire found to be the cause of a plaintiff’s injuries was 
declared a public hazard, and the court refused to grant a pretrial 
confidentiality order pursuant to the sunshine statute.160  Yet, in an 
action against an insurer for economic fraud, the court allowed a 
protective order.161  Economic fraud was not deemed a public hazard 
because the hazard must be tangible.162  Thus, a tangible medical 
device like the Dalkon Shield that causes injury to a plaintiff would 
classify as a “public hazard” if the court finds the device is likely to 
injure again.  Unlike the Washington statute, the future injury need 
not be similar to the instant case.163 
Sunshine laws run into due process problems when they allow 
courts to act on factual assumptions that are not yet determined.  
Florida, for example, prohibits courts from enforcing private 
settlement agreements that conceal a public hazard.164  But, the 
statute does not provide the party with the alleged public hazard any 
notice or opportunity to be heard on the issue of whether there is a 
real “public hazard.”165  In contrast, the Texas statute requires notice 
and a public evidentiary hearing.166  Thus, while Florida prohibits 
concealing hazards in any way, these due process restraints may keep 
 
157 FLA. STAT. § 69.081(2) (2004). 
158 Id. 
159 See Zitrin, supra note 33, at 891–92. 
160 Jones v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 871 So. 2d 899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). 
161 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sosnowski, 830 So. 2d 886 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002). 
162 See Stivers v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 777 So. 2d 1023 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
163 Florida’s broad definition only seems to exclude hazards that are distinctly not 
tangible.  Thus, it may reach medical malpractice claims, especially those resulting in 
physical damages.  Medical malpractice claimants would share several of the same 
concerns as other claimants in medical cases with substantial privacy interests. 
164 See FLA. STAT. § 69.081(4) (2004). 
165 See Zitrin, supra note 33, at 891–92. 
166 TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(4). 
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courts from applying the statute to private settlement agreements that, 
by nature, have not resolved important factual questions in court. 
Washington’s statute on confidential settlements presumes 
openness in all settlement agreements but allows the court to apply a 
balancing test to determine when and if it will enforce a confidential 
agreement.167  The court must determine whether confidentiality is in 
the public interest by balancing: (1) the public’s right to the 
information, against (2) the public’s right to protect the confidentiality 
of “trade secrets . . . , other confidential research, development, or 
commercial information concerning products or business 
methods.”168  The court balances the public interest in disclosure 
against business interests in secrecy, but fails to account for 
individual plaintiffs’ interests, including interests in privacy.  The 
other sunshine in litigation statutes also recognize exceptions for trade 
secrets.169  Personal privacy interests have not received the same level 
of concern.170 
C.  Problems with These Statutes in the Context of the Dalkon Shield 
Cases 
If the Dalkon Shield cases had been subject to the rules of South 
Carolina, Texas, Florida, and Washington, several issues would have 
arisen.  For advocates arguing for secrecy to protect the claimants’ 
privacy, these sunshine laws present significant disadvantages 
because of costly procedural hurdles and a lack of express exceptions 
for documents that invade parties’ privacy. 
 
167 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.611 (West 2005).  The statute does not apply to 
other court documents such as discovery documents.  Id. § (4)(a). 
168 Id. § 4.24.611(3)–(4)(b). 
169 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 69.081(7) (2004) (by showing good cause, a party can 
prevent disclosure of information, “including but not limited to alleged trade secrets”). 
170 Compare Boardman v. Elm Block Dev. Ltd. P’ship, 872 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tex. 
App. 1994) (sealing portions of a lease dispute record regarding tenant’s settlement tactics 
was overturned because no “specific, serious and substantial interest” outweighed 
presumption of openness), with Gen. Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tex. 
1998) (trade secrets may constitute a “specific, serious, and substantial interest” justifying 
sealing records.). 
 The comments from Judge Anderson show some concern for the privacy of litigants, but 
apparently only in cases that have attained a high degree of public exposure —not the early 
cases.  See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
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1.  Discovery Records 
Some discovery records involving private information might evade 
sunshine laws, but the more that documents relate to the public 
hazard, the more likely the court will refuse to keep it confidential.  
Because of A.H. Robins’s tactics in discovery, several women were 
forced to disclose highly personal information under sworn 
depositions or through requests for production of medical records.  
The defendants also shared sensitive information in discovery, 
information revealing the design of the Dalkon Shield and other 
potential trade secrets.  After a long battle, A.H. Robins finally 
disclosed the memos and tests that revealed the risks associated with 
the device.171 
States with sunshine laws allow discovery documents to be kept 
confidential in two main ways.  First, the documents will evade the 
statute if they are not filed discovery.  Unfiled discovery can be 
further protected by petitioning the court for a protective order 
requiring that those documents be returned.172  Second, if the statute 
does apply to the discovery documents, parties can argue that the 
documents fall under an exception, the clearest of which is the 
exception for trade secrets.  The trade secret exception favors 
defendant corporations over individual plaintiffs in medical products 
cases.  The plaintiffs’ medical records, while not explicitly protected 
from disclosure, do invoke HIPAA protections and are commonly 
kept private.173 
If a judicial discretion exception like South Carolina’s applies, the 
court can be more receptive to privacy arguments because the court 
can consider any “good cause” for confidentiality.  In contrast, 
Washington’s balancing test for granting exceptions only weighs 
business interests against the public interest in disclosure.  The lack of 
 
171 MINTZ, supra note 72, at 226. 
172 For Washington procedures, for example, see “Order for Access to Discovery 
Materials” 9A Wash. Prac. Series 26.103. 
173 Parties do not have unrestricted access to nonparty medical records; and conversely, 
nonparties should not have access to parties’ medical records.  78 Am. Jur. Trials 559, §7 
(2007) (“A plaintiff is entitled to disclosure of information regarding incidents giving rise 
to claims similar to his or her own.  However, nonparty patients of a private physician 
have a privacy interest in not having their names revealed to a plaintiff in a medical 
malpractice action.  Consequently, relevant patient records normally may be discovered 
after identifying information is redacted from the records.  In those cases in which mere 
redaction of the records is deemed insufficient to protect the patients’ right of privacy, the 
trial court, in its discretion, also may order the medical records sealed and allow only the 
parties’ attorneys and medical experts to have access to the medical records.”). 
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express exceptions for privacy makes it tougher and more time 
consuming for claimants to argue for a protective order or an 
exception to the sunshine statute. 
Another problem with a balancing test is that it tends to pit the 
public’s interest in disclosure against the plaintiff’s interest in 
privacy.  This approach does not recognize that the plaintiff is part of 
the public or that the public may have other interests, such as 
promoting settlement and protecting its members from unwanted 
exposure. 
2.  The “Good Cause” Requirement to Seal Other Court Documents 
Although some statutes provide exceptions to the rule of openness 
in settlements and other court documents when parties show “good 
cause,” the statutes do not clearly express an exception for privacy.  
This unfairly disadvantages claimants in medical cases. 
Florida’s statute is especially ambiguous.  It allows parties to 
oppose disclosure of specific facts with a motion showing good 
cause.174  If the court finds good cause but the records still contain 
“information which may be useful to members of the public in 
protecting themselves from injury,” the court must allow disclosure of 
only the information “necessary or useful to the public regarding the 
public hazard.”175  Thus, only the facts that are neither necessary nor 
useful may be kept confidential.  Though the statute does not define 
such facts, they might include names, medical history, or personal 
background information.  On the other hand, the public may have an 
interest in knowing whether the harm caused by the product was 
particular to an individual patient or whether it could affect other 
consumers similarly —personal medical information will often reveal 
this distinction. 
Because of its ambiguity, this requirement could be abused in cases 
like Dalkon Shield.  Since the statutes tend to favor business interests, 
a business can put its resources toward arguing against a plaintiff’s 
motion to keep her private information confidential, while the 
business’s important secrets remain protected.  A defendant can also 
argue for openness as a tactic to slow the case down, add to 
claimants’ costs, or discourage others from bringing claims.  For 
example, A.H. Robins eventually faced bankruptcy and lost 
 
174 FLA. STAT. § 69.081(7) (2004). 
175 Id. 
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credibility with the public.176  Damaging information about the 
company was being disclosed through the mass tort litigation and the 
media. It would have had very little to lose in arguing against any 
efforts from the claimants to keep personal information private. 
Thus, by expressly providing exceptions for business reasons and 
not personal privacy reasons, the statutes give a negligent business the 
upper hand while burdening vulnerable claimants.  These businesses 
can scare a plaintiff with the threat that her personal information will 
become public knowledge.  In the Dalkon Shield cases, many 
plaintiffs were scared away at the thought of disclosing such personal 
information.177  A clearly expressed exception for personal, private 
information— e specially medical information —would vastly 
improve sunshine laws for medical claimants. 
3.  Procedural Requirements 
The procedure by which the court decides whether to exempt 
certain information from the public file often disadvantages a 
claimant with privacy interests.  Many statutes allow for an in  
camera review of documents that a party seeks to keep confidential or 
sealed.178  This approach respects the parties’ desire for 
confidentiality.  Other statutes, however, call for a public hearing to 
decide a motion to seal records.  For example, Texas’s statute requires 
a public hearing and even allows nonparties to intervene in the 
proceedings.179  It only allows a court to review the records in camera 
“when necessary,” and does not indicate any circumstances that 
would necessitate a private review.180  Before the court decides the 
motion, a party can obtain a temporary sealing order only upon 
showing a “compelling need” through specific facts that “immediate 
and irreparable injury will result.”181  Again though, it does not 
indicate whether damage to one’s privacy interest would qualify as an 
immediate and irreparable injury.  Even if parties can make this 
showing, they must still endure a public hearing to make the sealing 
 
176 The A.H. Robins company filed for bankruptcy in 1985.  BACIGAL, supra note 9, at 
42.  In 1981, “60 Minutes” aired a “highly unfavorable” segment on the Dalkon Shield.  
MINTZ, supra note 72, at 207. 
177 Lord, supra note 14, at 27 n.11. 
178 See, e.g., § 69.081(7). 
179 TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(4). 
180 Id. 
181 Id. at 76a(5). 
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final.  This puts significant procedural hurdles in the way of claimants 
seeking privacy and forces their claims into the public eye. 
Having procedures for sealing documents and keeping settlements 
secret offers some promise of confidentiality for claimants in medical 
cases.  However, public hearings severely compromise this promise.  
Furthermore, nothing seems to be gained by requiring a public 
hearing on the question of openness.  An in camera review would 
allow courts to apply the same balancing test mandated by statute.  In 
a closed review, the court can consider the public’s interest in 
disclosure and the parties can represent their own interests.  Although 
the public is arguably absent from these proceedings, a judge can 
adequately account for what the public might want or need to know.  
Sunshine statutes already impose a presumption of openness.  Forcing 
claimants to argue for their own privacy in a public hearing submits 
them to more scrutiny than necessary, is disrespectful of the parties’ 
wishes, and demeans the court’s ability to weigh competing interests. 
4.  Other Hurdles for Claimants 
Restrictions on secret settlements present two other problems for 
claimants in medical cases with privacy interests.  First, they may 
chill litigation by leading claimants to believe they must choose 
between their privacy and legal redress.  As Ms. Menkel-Meadow 
points out, injured claimants often want to tell their story, but not 
always in a public forum.182  This fear should not exclude these 
individuals from pursuing compensation for defendants’ wrongdoing. 
Second, even though courts can grant exceptions to the 
presumption of openness, medical defendants have many advantages 
when arguing against plaintiffs who are seeking these exceptions.  
Defendants, such as product manufacturing companies, have express 
business-interest exceptions on their side and often have more time 
and money.183  While a business can wait litigation out, an injured 
claimant may need relief immediately.  Thus, defendants — the very 
entities that secrecy bans purport to regulate— m ay have an 
advantage in medical cases and other cases in which the plaintiff 
might desire secrecy. 
 
182 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 105, at 516–17. 
183 The Dalkon Shield defendants certainly took advantage of the disparity in resources 
by causing delays and using procedural maneuvers to rack up the costs for plaintiffs’ 
attorneys.  BACIGAL, supra note 9, at 16. 
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IV 
ALTERNATIVES TO SUNSHINE LAWS IN MEDICAL CASES 
Claimants in medical cases should not be subject to sunshine laws.  
States with sunshine laws should provide express exemptions to the 
rule of openness for parties with strong privacy interests, particularly 
for claimants involved in medical claims.  States that do not have 
sunshine laws should consider other means of disclosing dangers to 
the public that do not compromise legitimate privacy interests.184  
Rather than forcing medical claimants to “report” public dangers 
through open settlement, states can place the burden of reporting 
elsewhere.  For example, states can require that the payers of the 
claims (usually defendants), the lawyers, or the court report the 
danger to the public. 
A.  Payers of Claims Reporting to the Government 
One option for reporting public harms is to require those who pay 
the claims to report the harm.  Federal regulations currently provide 
that payers, including insurance companies, must report the settlement 
of any medical malpractice action or claim to the National 
Practitioner Data Bank.185  This only requires reporting the doctor’s 
name, the amount of the payment, the name of the hospital, and a 
description of the acts or omissions and injuries that gave rise to the 
claim.186 
This amount of information may not be sufficient to fully 
investigate every known medical claim.  To strengthen this reporting 
requirement, states or the federal government should: (1) expand the 
types of claims beyond medical malpractice to include medical 
products and drug claims; (2) require payers to submit additional 
information regarding the product, drug, or instrument that caused the 
harm; and (3) require an agency like the FDA to investigate the 
alleged defect in those products.  The investigation may require 
checking the tests done by the defendant or it could involve full 
independent research. 
 
184 Other reasons for sunshine laws exist aside from merely informing the public of 
public harms.  See Fiftal, supra note 134, at 533 (citing Doré, supra note 30, at 402).  
These include public trust in the judicial system and public monitoring of the system. 
185 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131, 11133; 45 C.F.R. pt. 60. 
186 42 U.S.C. § 11131.  The payer must also report information that will assist the 
Secretary in interpreting the information reported.  Id. 
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Federal agencies could implement a process to determine which 
claims merit an in-depth investigation, taking account of their 
financial limitations, the gravity of the harm, the number of related 
claims, and other factors.187  Based on their findings, the agency 
could then report the results of the investigation to hospitals, medical 
suppliers, pharmacies, individual doctors, and the media, as 
necessary. 
The federal reporting system has several advantages.  First, it 
places the burden of reporting on the party most likely to be at fault 
and least likely to have a legitimate claim to privacy and 
confidentiality.  Second, it protects trade secrets by reporting directly 
to the government and limiting outsiders’ access to the information.  
Lastly, federal reporting places important information into the hands 
of the governmental body with the power to exact regulations over the 
medical product or recall it altogether. 
The problem with the federal reporting system is that the payers of 
claims have too much control over what they report.  Requiring the 
payers of claims, such as manufacturers and their insurance 
companies, to report their products’ defects opens the door to abuse.  
Payers of claims have every incentive to minimize the appearance of 
defects in their products or to underreport.  For example, A.H. Robins 
misrepresented facts to the FDA when the Dalkon Shield first came to 
the FDA’s attention.188  It even ignored its own internal memoranda 
and testing that revealed the inherent dangers in its product.  Only the 
eventual pressure of litigation stopped the company— b ut it remains 
uncertain whether A.H. Robins’s executives ever owned up to the 
damage they caused or whether they felt remorse.189 
Therefore, even defendants whose liability is certain may be 
incapable of owning up to their flaws and reporting their errors.  
Defendants who settle suits in which several elements of the product 
liability claim remain uncertain will not necessarily know what to 
report and may underreport.  Thus, a federal reporting by payers 
 
187 For instance, the agency could ask courts to submit their findings of fact, if any were 
produced, on the question of whether a “public hazard” existed.  They could use these 
findings to determine whether an in-depth investigation is necessary.  Requiring or at least 
encouraging courts to submit these findings would also avoid the due process problems 
described in Part III.B. 
188 See Lord, supra note 14, at 13; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 105, at 518–19. 
189 Judge Lord’s Annotated Reprimand notes that A.H. Robins executives heard his 
entire speech and then said, “I didn’t think that was so bad.”  Lord, supra note 14, at 26–
27 n.10. 
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system lacks teeth.  However, it offers one alternative to open 
settlements by requiring that at least some information will make it to 
the public. 
B.  Amend the Ethical Rules to Require Lawyer Reporting 
Ethical rules could be amended to allow or require lawyers to 
report public harms in cases of great public interest.  Commentators 
have suggested rules that prohibit lawyers from hiding public harms 
through secret settlement agreements.190  Richard Zitrin proposed the 
following addition to Model Rule 3.2: 
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making an agreement, 
whether in connection with a lawsuit or otherwise, to prevent or 
restrict the availability to the public of information that the lawyer 
reasonably believes directly concerns a substantial danger to the 
public health or safety, or to the health or safety of any particular 
individual(s).191 
This rule would effectively act as a sunshine law that cuts off the use 
of secret settlements before they are created.  It would reach a wide 
range of agreements, including private settlement agreements not 
filed with the court and agreements not connected with a lawsuit.  It 
would also require attorneys, rather than the courts, to determine 
when a claim involves a “substantial danger to the public health or 
safety.”192  Mr. Zitrin primarily envisions a lawyer torn between his 
client’s financial interest and his concern for the public good.  His 
rule would allow a lawyer to simply point to an ethical rule and say 
“we cannot participate in such agreements.” 
A lawyer who represents medical claimants may find this 
suggestion offensive.  Telling a client with strong privacy interests at 
stake that the lawyer simply cannot make her claim or other private 
information confidential contradicts the lawyer’s duty to his client.  It 
is also at odds with both the duty of loyalty and the duty of 
confidentiality. 
A more targeted solution for lawyers facing the competing interests 
of the public good and their clients, would be to report out, rather than 
 
190 Richard Zitrin, Why Lawyers Keep Secrets About Public Harm, 12 PROF. LAW. 4, 
Summer 2001, at 13; see also Fiftal, supra note 134, at 513 (noting other commentators).  
For an interesting argument that existing ethical rules already prohibit secret settlements 
including public harms, see Jon Bauer, Buying Witness Silence: Evidence-Suppressing 
Settlements and Lawyers’ Ethics, 87 OR. L. REV. 481 (2008). 
191 Zitrin, supra note 8, at 116. 
192 Id. at 116. 
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prohibit secret settlements altogether.  Lawyers could be required or 
allowed to report dangers to the public by expanding the current 
Model Rule 1.6(b),193 which permits disclosure of client information 
in certain instances.  Expanding this rule would allow lawyers to 
reveal the information particularly important to the public while 
retaining the ability to use secret settlements.  Reporting out by 
lawyers, like federal reporting requirements, would put information in 
the hands of the authorities that can address the public harm.  Yet, 
expanding exceptions to Rule 1.6(b) would take another slice out of 
lawyers’ duty of confidentiality, already significantly altered since the 
2000 amendments to the rule.194 
Several aspects of Rule 1.6(b) would necessarily change to allow 
attorneys to report public harms — likely, too many aspects would 
change.  Rather than allowing lawyers to reveal only information that 
would prevent “reasonably certain” death, substantial bodily harm, 
financial crimes, or fraud, the rule would need to extend to 
information likely to cause harm to the public.195  This would include 
information in medical products cases in which the cause of the 
patient’s harm and the defendant’s liability had not been proven with 
absolute certainty, as is the case in many settlements.  The rule would 
also need to extend to information not necessarily related to the 
lawyer’s own client, unless defendants’ attorneys can be expected to 
disclose harmful information about their clients.196  Then, if the rule 
were to have the full effect of a reporting requirement, it would need 
to replace “may reveal” with “shall reveal.”197  Lawyers already have 
the option of revealing adverse parties’ harmful information, short of 
a protective order or a secrecy agreement.198  An affirmative duty to 
reveal this information would eliminate hiding public harms.  Secrecy 
 
193 ABA Model Rule 1.6(b)(1) states: “A lawyer may reveal information relating to the 
representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to 
prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2007). 
194 See Jason Popp, The Cost of Attorney-Client Confidentiality in Post 9/11 America, 
20 GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICS 875, 879 (2007). 
195 The “reasonably certain” requirement replaced the prior “imminent harm” 
requirement.  ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Proposed Rule 1.6 Public 
Discussion Draft, Mar. 23, 1999, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k/rule16draft.html. 
196 Richard Zitrin strongly disagrees that defense attorneys would report their clients.  
Zitrin, supra note 190, at 20. 
197 For more on the benefits of an affirmative duty to reveal public harms and the lack 
of incentives to do so, see Popp, supra note 194, at 880–81. 
198 Lawyers owe no duty of confidentiality to opposing parties. 
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agreements would still be possible, although the reporting 
requirement would severely limit the information that may be kept 
secret, giving defendants little incentive to agree to them. 
These expansions to Rule 1.6(b) have not been adopted and should 
not be adopted for many reasons.  Imposing an affirmative duty on 
attorneys to reveal public harms would be unwieldy to enforce and 
hard to follow, especially given a lawyer’s more important duty to her 
client.  Requiring attorneys to determine when they must report 
dangers to the public puts attorneys in the position of effectively 
representing an illusive third party — the pubic. 
One way of avoiding some of the problems with expanding Rule 
1.6(b) would be to provide lawyers with a mechanism for reporting 
information about public harms to a court or government body.  An 
amendment to the current rule might state: 
A lawyer may reveal information relating to a client’s case that the 
lawyer reasonably believes is likely to prevent substantial danger to 
the public health or safety.  The lawyer may report as much 
information as he or she believes would assist a court or 
government body to investigate the harm.  The report need not 
disclose the names of the client, the lawyer, or the case.  The lawyer 
shall either make the report to the court in the jurisdiction where the 
case arose, or an appropriate government body.  Disclosure to a 
court or government body will not breach a contractual agreement 
to not reveal such information, but disclosure to other entities such 
as news media may still breach such a contractual agreement. 
A report to the court or governmental body would disclose helpful 
information to those who could then address the harm.  At the same 
time, because the report can be made anonymously, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys could maintain their clients’ confidentiality.  This 
permissible mechanism for disclosure would still disincentive 
defendants from agreeing to secret settlements, knowing that 
opposing counsel could lawfully breach that confidentiality.  But, 
limiting the disclosure to a court or government body would assure 
defendants that a regulating body would at least investigate the harm 
before disclosing it to the public.  The express prohibition on 
reporting to the media may provide defendants with enough 
protection that secret settlements will continue to be a viable 
option.199  The amendment would also prevent attorneys from 
 
199 See Doré, supra note 30, at 398–99 (arguing against rules allowing disclosure of 
specific facts because “defendants pay a premium to secure the confidentiality of their 
compromise and would not settle at all if its amount or conditions could be readily 
broadcast to the media or other existing or potential claimants”). 
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maliciously disclosing information that was irrelevant to investigating 
a public harm.  Thus, providing lawyers with a permissive mechanism 
for disclosing specific information on public harms would address 
many of the concerns for the public good, as well as the concerns of 
individual parties. 
C.  Allow Courts to Disclose Certain Facts to Regulating Bodies, Like 
the FDA 
Another alternative to sunshine laws would enable courts involved 
with secret settlements to disclose certain important facts from those 
settlements.  When parties seek to file settlement documents under 
seal, courts acting under sunshine laws are compelled to deny such 
requests except in rare cases.  States without sunshine laws must 
consider the public’s common law right of access to court documents 
before sealing records.200  However, courts in these jurisdictions 
commonly allow sealing court documents like settlement agreements 
that have “no direct relation to court action.”201  There is room 
between these two extremes, of public disclosure and nondisclosure, 
for courts to determine what information should be disclosed and in 
which cases. 
Courts should be encouraged to consider the benefits of public 
access, but only to the extent that public access is necessary to avoid 
injury to other third parties.  Courts have typically had a limited role 
in the agreements made between parties out of court.  However, once 
parties seek to file these agreements with the court, the court’s 
involvement brings a public aspect to the case.  Even those who 
strongly support litigants’ right to make a secret settlement would 
likely feel troubled by the court’s complacency in hiding significant 
public harms. 
Commentators have suggested judicial balancing tests to determine 
when to allow sealing court documents.  Sharon Sobczak 
recommends balancing several factors with the goal of public access 
being paramount.202  These factors include harm done to the parties 
by not sealing, harm to the public by sealing, whether less restrictive 
alternatives exist, and whether the public has alternate means of 
 
200 Fiftal, supra note 134, at 511–12. 
201 Id. at 511. 
202 Sharon L. Sobczak, To Seal or Not to Seal? In Search of Standards, 60 DEF. COUNS. 
J. 406, 415–18 (1993). 
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getting the information, such as the media or government agencies.203  
Other balancing tests incorporate fewer considerations, providing for 
more narrow exceptions to the presumption of public access.  For 
example, Oregon has adopted a balancing test that strongly favors 
public access to settlements in civil cases where a public body is the 
defendant.204  In these cases, the court may only keep certain 
identifying information in the settlement agreement confidential if it 
finds the identified person’s interest in privacy outweighs the public’s 
interest in disclosure.205  Drake University Professor Laurie Doré 
recommends a balancing test that errs on the side of protecting 
confidentiality.206  Rather than forcing all settlements to be open, her 
test focuses on whether openness will achieve an important objective 
of public access.207 
Courts can refuse to keep harmful products and other hazards 
hidden from the public, while still allowing for secret settlements, by 
taking action that would disclose the harm but not the entire case.  
The judicial system is in the unique position of being aware of alleged 
wrongful conduct and having the ability to act on this knowledge.  
Judge Lord, before signing the settlement agreement in a consolidated 
Dalkon Shield case, expressed his desire to take action in the Dalkon 
Shield litigation when he said, 
If this were a case in equity, I would order that your company make 
an effort to locate each and every woman who still wears this 
device, and to recall your product.  I would order you now to take to 
the [FDA] a correct and proper report on what’s happened with 
these devices.  If I did that, they would order you to recall.208 
 
203 Id. at 415–18.  Regarding the “alternative means” factor, Sobczak points out: 
In most cases, judges can be fairly confident that an executive or administrative 
agency will discover such information through its own processes, but if they are 
not certain that this will be successful, they can condition the sealing on 
restricted disclosure to a government agency.  This would put pressure on a 
manufacturer to correct potentially dangerous aspects of a product. 
Id. at 418. 
204 OR. REV. STAT. § 17.095 (2007). 
205 Id. at § 17.095(2)(b)(B). 
206 Doré, supra note 30, at 286.  For another example of a proposed balancing test, see 
Jillian Smith, Secret Settlements: What You Don’t Know Can Kill You!, 2004 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 237, 265 (2004) (balancing a “specific, serious, and substantial interest” against “any 
probable adverse effect that sealing will have on the public health or safety”) (citing TEX. 
R. CIV. P. 76a(1)(a)). 
207 Doré, supra note 30, at 286. 
208 Lord, supra note 14, at 13. 
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States should consider giving courts the kind of equitable powers that 
Judge Lord describes.  Courts could carefully disclose important 
information in two ways. 
First, rather than applying a presumption of openness to every filed 
settlement, state statutes should respect the parties’ mutual desire for 
confidentiality.  Statutes should allow courts to issue temporary 
sealing orders upon the parties’ request.209  Then courts could 
determine, in camera, whether any information should be disclosed.  
The court should then disclose that information by leaving it out of 
the otherwise sealed settlement file, or the court can disclose it to a 
regulating body, like the FDA.  This accomplishes several things: (1) 
it respects parties’ autonomy in agreeing to a confidential settlement, 
(2) it protects vulnerable plaintiffs with privacy interests, and (3) it 
actively puts important information in the hands of a group with the 
ability to address the public harm.  This approach is especially 
appropriate in medical products cases because it accounts for both the 
deeply private aspects of the case as well as the important public 
issues. 
The second option for court-initiated reporting would allow the 
courts to require defendants to inform the class of people in danger of 
harm.  If, after inspecting the information that parties have agreed to 
keep secret, the court determines that a certain group should be 
informed of a potential harm, it may order a defendant to inform that 
group.  In the Dalkon Shield cases, this group would likely have 
included every woman currently using the device and every doctor 
who possessed a Dalkon Shield.  The burden would fall on the 
company to find the people in the affected class.  The court could 
oversee this process and it could specify the type of notice defendants 
must provide.  For products liability cases, the notice could be a 
strong warning or a total recall, depending on what the situation 
merits.  If the company failed to inform the class in a reasonable time, 
the court could disclose certain facts in a manner best apprised to 
reach the class — such as public service announcements or a 
newspaper story.  This approach could also work in contexts other 
than medical products cases.  For example, a defendant who had done 
environmental harm in a single community could confine its notice to 
that community while preserving its reputation in other geographic 
areas. 
 
209 Compare supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
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There are several issues that arise within each approach.  The 
primary problem with the first approach, which gives courts the 
discretion to report public harm information in settlements, is the 
chance for wide variations among courts and judges in how much 
information to report and how often.  Allowing courts to pick 
information out of an otherwise confidential settlement places a great 
deal of discretion and responsibility on judges.  Judges with large 
dockets may fail to take the time to probe the documents for evidence 
of a public harm.210  However, Professor Doré points out that courts 
will not blindly endorse confidentiality agreements in the settlements 
that come before them.211  She also notes that some degree of 
discretion is inevitable when balancing public interest against the will 
of the parties.212 
Due process is the main issue that arises in the second approach, 
which grants courts the authority to require that defendants notify a 
specific at-risk class of individuals.  If the court determines that a 
defendant must take some action that assumes fault or liability, that 
court may be imposing punishment before determining liability.  The 
Florida District Court of Appeals held that a court cannot preempt 
these determinations, such as determining that something constitutes a 
“public hazard” under Florida’s law, pursuant to the Due Process 
Clause.213  However, that court remanded the case for an evidentiary 
hearing, which would have resolved the due process problems from 
the start.214  Thus, courts could avoid due process problems, while 
still protecting litigants’ privacy, by holding closed evidentiary 
hearings on whether something constitutes a public harm before 
taking action to disclose that harm.  In addition to these measures, 
courts should take other steps to protect privacy by redacting the 
parties’ identities from the record or by using pseudonyms.  After 
determining if and how much of the settlement will be sealed, the 
court can open future proceedings or include the identities in the 
record.  Until that point, however, parties’ mutual agreement of 
confidentiality can and should be upheld. 
 
 
210 See Zitrin, supra note 190, at 20. 
211 Doré, supra note 30, at 396. 
212 Id. 
213 DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Lambert, 654 So. 2d 226, 227–28 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1995). 
214 Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Medical cases involve very private information that claimants 
legitimately seek to keep confidential in settlement.  Yet, as several 
states have found, the public may also have a compelling interest in 
knowing the contents of a medical settlement.  The Dalkon Shield 
cases exemplify the difficult tension in medical products liability 
cases when the public’s strong interest in knowing runs counter to its 
interest in protecting privacy.  Sunshine laws are too broad, forcing 
medical cases into the open when less invasive action could 
adequately inform the public.  Sunshine laws should expressly 
provide exceptions to the presumption of openness when litigants 
show a strong interest in keeping personal and private information 
confidential.  States should err on the side of confidentiality in cases 
involving medical claims with a mutually agreed-upon secrecy 
agreement. 
However, the legal system need not take a passive role in 
confidential settlements that invoke strong public interest concerns.  
Federal regulations can be broadened to require medical product 
manufacturers to report the claims they pay out.  Lawyers could be 
allowed or required to report known harms likely to cause injury to 
the public.  The most effective means of disclosing public harms 
through the legal system, however, starts with the courts.  Courts, 
while still respecting litigants’ confidentiality, should be empowered 
to closely consider filed settlement records that might involve a public 
harm.  If the court finds the settlement seeks to hide a public harm, it 
can either refuse to seal certain specific information, or it can take 
action to disclose that information to a government body or the class 
of at-risk individuals.  Rather than imposing openness in all instances, 
these narrower approaches can adequately inform the public while 
respecting litigants’ desire for confidentiality. 
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